10 research outputs found
Selection Lemmas for various geometric objects
Selection lemmas are classical results in discrete geometry that have been
well studied and have applications in many geometric problems like weak epsilon
nets and slimming Delaunay triangulations. Selection lemma type results
typically show that there exists a point that is contained in many objects that
are induced (spanned) by an underlying point set.
In the first selection lemma, we consider the set of all the objects induced
(spanned) by a point set . This question has been widely explored for
simplices in , with tight bounds in . In our paper,
we prove first selection lemma for other classes of geometric objects. We also
consider the strong variant of this problem where we add the constraint that
the piercing point comes from . We prove an exact result on the strong and
the weak variant of the first selection lemma for axis-parallel rectangles,
special subclasses of axis-parallel rectangles like quadrants and slabs, disks
(for centrally symmetric point sets). We also show non-trivial bounds on the
first selection lemma for axis-parallel boxes and hyperspheres in
.
In the second selection lemma, we consider an arbitrary sized subset of
the set of all objects induced by . We study this problem for axis-parallel
rectangles and show that there exists an point in the plane that is contained
in rectangles. This is an improvement over the previous
bound by Smorodinsky and Sharir when is almost quadratic
On the Structure of Learnability Beyond P/Poly
Motivated by the goal of showing stronger structural results about the complexity of learning, we study the learnability of strong concept classes beyond P/poly, such as PSPACE/poly and EXP/poly. We show the following:
1) (Unconditional Lower Bounds for Learning) Building on [Adam R. Klivans et al., 2013], we prove unconditionally that BPE/poly cannot be weakly learned in polynomial time over the uniform distribution, even with membership and equivalence queries.
2) (Robustness of Learning) For the concept classes EXP/poly and PSPACE/poly, we show unconditionally that worst-case and average-case learning are equivalent, that PAC-learnability and learnability over the uniform distribution are equivalent, and that membership queries do not help in either case.
3) (Reducing Succinct Search to Decision for Learning) For the decision problems R_{Kt} and R_{KS} capturing the complexity of learning EXP/poly and PSPACE/poly respectively, we show a succinct search to decision reduction: for each of these problems, the problem is in BPP iff there is a probabilistic polynomial-time algorithm computing circuits encoding proofs for positive instances of the problem. This is shown via a more general result giving succinct search to decision results for PSPACE, EXP and NEXP, which might be of independent interest.
4) (Implausibility of Oblivious Strongly Black-Box Reductions showing NP-hardness of learning NP/poly) We define a natural notion of hardness of learning with respect to oblivious strongly black-box reductions. We show that learning PSPACE/poly is PSPACE-hard with respect to oblivious strongly black-box reductions. On the other hand, if learning NP/poly is NP-hard with respect to oblivious strongly black-box reductions, the Polynomial Hierarchy collapses
Deterministically Counting Satisfying Assignments for Constant-Depth Circuits with Parity Gates, with Implications for Lower Bounds
We give a deterministic algorithm for counting the number of satisfying assignments of any AC^0[oplus] circuit C of size s and depth d over n variables in time 2^(n-f(n,s,d)), where f(n,s,d) = n/O(log(s))^(d-1), whenever s = 2^o(n^(1/d)). As a consequence, we get that for each d, there is a language in E^{NP} that does not have AC^0[oplus] circuits of size 2^o(n^(1/(d+1))). This is the first lower bound in E^{NP} against AC^0[oplus] circuits that beats the lower bound of 2^Omega(n^(1/2(d-1))) due to Razborov and Smolensky for large d. Both our algorithm and our lower bounds extend to AC^0[p] circuits for any prime p
Distribution-Free Proofs of Proximity
Motivated by the fact that input distributions are often unknown in advance,
distribution-free property testing considers a setting in which the algorithmic
task is to accept functions having a certain property
and reject functions that are -far from , where the
distance is measured according to an arbitrary and unknown input distribution
. As usual in property testing, the tester is required to do so
while making only a sublinear number of input queries, but as the distribution
is unknown, we also allow a sublinear number of samples from the distribution
.
In this work we initiate the study of distribution-free interactive proofs of
proximity (df-IPP) in which the distribution-free testing algorithm is assisted
by an all powerful but untrusted prover. Our main result is a df-IPP for any
problem , with communication, sample, query,
and verification complexities, for any proximity parameter
. For such proximity parameters, this result matches the
parameters of the best-known general purpose IPPs in the standard uniform
setting, and is optimal under reasonable cryptographic assumptions.
For general values of the proximity parameter , our
distribution-free IPP has optimal query complexity but the
communication complexity is , which
is worse than what is known for uniform IPPs when . With
the aim of improving on this gap, we further show that for IPPs over
specialised, but large distribution families, such as sufficiently smooth
distributions and product distributions, the communication complexity can be
reduced to (keeping the query
complexity roughly the same as before) to match the communication complexity of
the uniform case
Optimally Deceiving a Learning Leader in Stackelberg Games
Recent results have shown that algorithms for learning the optimal commitment in a Stackelberg game are susceptible to manipulation by the follower. These learning algorithms operate by querying the best responses of the follower, who consequently can deceive the algorithm by using fake best responses, typically by responding according to fake payoffs that are different from the actual ones. For this strategic behavior to be successful, the main challenge faced by the follower is to pinpoint the fake payoffs that would make the learning algorithm output a commitment that benefits them the most. While this problem has been considered before, the related literature has only focused on a simple setting where the follower can only choose from a finite set of payoff matrices, thus leaving the general version of the problem unanswered. In this paper, we fill this gap by showing that it is always possible for the follower to efficiently compute (near-)optimal fake payoffs, for various scenarios of learning interaction between the leader and the follower. Our results also establish an interesting connection between the followerâs deception and the leaderâs maximin utility: through deception, the follower can induce almost any (fake) Stackelberg equilibrium if and only if the leader obtains at least their maximin utility in this equilibrium
Improved learning of k-parities
We consider the problem of learning k-parities in the online mistake-bound model: given a hidden vector xâ{0,1}n where the hamming weight of x is k and a sequence of âquestionsâ a1,a2,âŠâ{0,1}n, where the algorithm must reply to each question with ăai,xă(mod2), what is the best trade-off between the number of mistakes made by the algorithm and its time complexity? We improve the previous best result of Buhrman et al. [3] by an expâĄ(k) factor in the time complexity. Next, we consider the problem of learning k-parities in the PAC model in the presence of random classification noise of rate [Formula Presented]. Here, we observe that even in the presence of classification noise of non-trivial rate, it is possible to learn k-parities in time better than (nk/2), whereas the current best algorithm for learning noisy k-parities, due to Grigorescu et al. [9], inherently requires time (nk/2) even when the noise rate is polynomially small.Peer reviewe
Optimally Deceiving a Learning Leader in Stackelberg Games
Recent results in the ML community have revealed that learning algorithms used to compute the optimal strategy for the leader to commit to in a Stackelberg game, are susceptible to manipulation by the follower. Such a learning algorithm operates by querying the best responses or the payoffs of the follower, who consequently can deceive the algorithm by responding as if their payoffs were much different than what they actually are. For this strategic behavior to be successful, the main challenge faced by the follower is to pinpoint the payoffs that would make the learning algorithm compute a commitment so that best responding to it maximizes the follower's utility, according to the true payoffs. While this problem has been considered before, the related literature only focused on the simplified scenario in which the payoff space is finite, thus leaving the general version of the problem unanswered. In this paper, we fill this gap by showing that it is always possible for the follower to efficiently compute (near-)optimal payoffs for various scenarios of learning interaction between the leader and the follower
Beyond natural proofs : hardness magnification and locality
Hardness magnification reduces major complexity separations (such as EXP â NC1) to proving lower bounds for some natural problem Q against weak circuit models. Several recent works [11, 13, 14, 40, 42, 43, 46] have established results of this form. In the most intriguing cases, the required lower bound is known for problems that appear to be significantly easier than Q, while Q itself is susceptible to lower bounds, but these are not yet sufficient for magnification.
In this work, we provide more examples of this phenomenon and investigate the prospects of proving new lower bounds using this approach. In particular, we consider the following essential questions associated with the hardness magnification program:
â Does hardness magnification avoid the natural proofs barrier of Razborov and Rudich [51]?
â Can we adapt known lower-bound techniques to establish the desired lower bound for Q?
We establish that some instantiations of hardness magnification overcome the natural proofs barrier in the following sense: slightly superlinear-size circuit lower bounds for certain versions of the minimum circuit-size problem imply the non-existence of natural proofs. As the non-existence of natural proofs implies the non-existence of efficient learning algorithms, we show that certain magnification theorems not only imply strong worst-case circuit lower bounds but also rule out the existence of efficient learning algorithms.
Hardness magnification might sidestep natural proofs, but we identify a source of difficulty when trying to adapt existing lower-bound techniques to prove strong lower bounds via magnification. This is captured by a locality barrier: existing magnification theorems unconditionally show that the problems Q considered above admit highly efficient circuits extended with small fan-in oracle gates, while lower-bound techniques against weak circuit models quite often easily extend to circuits containing such oracles. This explains why direct adaptations of certain lower bounds are unlikely to yield strong complexity separations via hardness magnification